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Article 4

Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy
PhilipJ. Weiser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The next generation of telecommunications regulation will differ
from the twentieth century model in both substance and institutional
strategy. In short, the advent of digital, packet-switched broadband
networks that carry all forms of communication will restructure
traditional telecommunications markets, requiring a new regulatory
strategy. At present, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "the Commission") and commentators have only just begun to

consider the alternatives for an Internet-centric, next generation
regulatory strategy.
In the Internet era, the substantive focus of the FCC will increasingly
shift to consider the challenges of technological convergence and the
implications of digital technology-be it for the delivery of video, data,
or voice. 1 Over time, the FCC will thus need to shift its focus from
specific regulatory approaches based on the particular technology
platform-say, a distinct regime for satellite, wireless, cable, or
telephone networks-to a "layered model" of telecommunications
regulation that regulates functionally similar services in the same way
regardless of the underlying platform. 2 In its ongoing efforts to reform
* Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado School of
Law. Thanks to Barbara Esbin, Ray Gifford, Dale Hatfield, Randy May, and Jon Nuechterlein
for their helpful comments and encouragement. Special thanks to Evan Rothstein for first-rate
research assistance and Jane Thompson for terrific library assistance.
1. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 889 (2003) (noting that technological
convergence "has begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction among voice,
video, and data communications, in which each type of service was governed by a separate
regulatory regime").
2. For discussions of the benefits of this approach, see Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for
Internet Policy, I J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002), and Douglas C. Sicker &
Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002). See also Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information
Platforms, I J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4-15 (2002) [hereinafter Weiser, Law and
Information Platforms] (discussing layering and "information platforms" concepts).
The
European Union has already begun to move in this direction. See Scott J. Marcus, The Emerging
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inter-carrier compensation arrangements, to modernize its spectrum
policy, and to develop a new framework
for broadband policy, the FCC
3
is moving in exactly this direction.
The rise of the Internet and the pro-competitive, deregulatory
direction called for by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom
Act") 4 have transformed the role and structure of regulation in the
telecommunications industry. Traditionally, the FCC relied on a
proactive command and control regime that limited the freedom of
telecommunications carriers to act as they chose. 5 In general, the
limitations imposed on telecommunications carriers reflected their
status as regulated monopoly providers. Notably, under "Baxter's
Law," 6 the imposition of price regulation on such carriers created an

incentive for them to engage in anticompetitive and anticonsumer
practices, such as shifting costs from competitive services to regulated
monopoly ones and shifting profits in the other direction. 7 In the new
Internet-centric environment, where almost none of the relevant services
are subject to price regulation, the FCC has the opportunity-and
indeed the responsibility-to consider alternative regulatory strategies.
The traditions of Internet governance and telecommunications
regulation view the role of government in very different terms, but these
two regimes may well converge on a set of regulatory strategies for the
next generation, Internet-centric network. Notably, both academic and
policy commentators, who once touted self-regulation as an alternative
to public regulation in the Internet context, 8 continue to move toward a

EU Regulatory Framework: An Innovative Response to Convergence, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &

HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
3. See, e.g., Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, ET Docket 02-135 (November 2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2003); Inquiry Concerning High-speed Access to Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order]; Appropriate Framework
for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter
Wireline Broadband NPRM]; Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, para. 122 (2001).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L,No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
5.

Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated

Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1998) (describing old model of regulation).
6. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (defining Baxter's Law).
7. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the InternetAge, 17 HARV. J.L.

& TECH. (forthcoming December 2003).
8. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 501 (1997).
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greater appreciation of the value of governmental oversight. 9 As for the
FCC, it is beginning to realize that its traditional reliance on proactive
command and control regulation should give way as it regulates fastmoving markets that are not price-regulated or, at present anyway,
dominated by an entrenched monopoly.' 0 An important test of this
awareness will be how it addresses the demands for access to and the
regulation of broadband platforms such as cable modems and DSL."
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II outlines the issue of what,
if any, access requirements might be imposed on broadband platforms,
such as DSL or cable modem services. Part III explains how the
Telecom Act provides ample authority, under its ancillary jurisdiction
framework, for the FCC to regulate Internet and equipment markets that

it must monitor to carry out its central regulatory mission. Part IV
examines the FCC's legal authority to address the broadband policy
issue. Finally, Part V addresses the substance of how the FCC should
regulate broadband platforms, arguing that an "antitrust-like" approach
to regulation can provide an effective alternative to the FCC's
traditional model of proactive regulation.
II.

THE INTERNET ERA, ITS REGULATORY CHALLENGES, AND THE
BROADBAND ACCESS ISSUE

The Internet era presents a number of challenges that relate to the
FCC's regulation of the physical platforms that support the Internet and
9. See, e.g., Zoe Baird, Governing the Internet: Engaging Government, Business, and
Nonprofits, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15, 15 (2002) (arguing that "[a] reliance on markets and selfpolicing has failed to address adequately important interests of Internet users such as privacy
protection, security and access to diverse content" and that it is time for governments to play a
role on key Internet policy issues), availableat http://www.markle.org/news/06-Baird_ I5_20.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2003). But see Charles Cooper, Do Gooders Will Wreck the Internet,
CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2010-1071-978983.html (Jan. 3, 2003) (criticizing the
Baird article). As Baird acknowledges, the evolution in thinking on the role for government in
Internet regulation is indebted to Lawrence Lessig's seminal discussion of the issue in
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
10. See Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Services, 16
F.C.C.R. 22,745, para. 5 (2001) ("[T]he one-wire world for customer access appears no longer to
be the norm in the broadband services market as the result of the development of intermodal
competition among multiple platforms, including DSL, cable modem service, satellite broadband
service, and terrestrial and mobile wireless services.").
II. This Article's discussion of the appropriate regulatory framework for broadband platforms
focuses on competition policy issues, putting to one side other matters addressed by common
carrier regulation. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (requirements to facilitate access to
information needed by law enforcement); 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2000) (regulation of exits from the
market); 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000) (regulation of privacy related to customer proprietary network
information); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (universal service); 47 U.S.C. § 255(c)
(2000) (access to telecommunications service for disabled persons); 47 U.S.C. § 256 (2000)
(network reliability).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

other forms of content delivery. Significantly, the "physical layer" is
part of the information industries' ecosystem that includes not just the
"content layer," but also the "applications" and "logical" layers that
facilitate the viewing and usage of content. 12 Used in this sense,
content is a broad concept that includes, among other things, video
games, interactive video, and text messaging. To work effectively, all
forms of content delivered over the Internet rely on an applicationsuch as a web browser, media player, or instant messaging system-as
well as the Internet's logical layer, which is comprised of software
standards such as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
("TCP/IP").
The FCC's main responsibilities related to the Internet involve the
regulation of the physical layer.
The physical communications
facilities, along with the open standards at the logical layer and
applications like web browsers, constitute "information platforms," in
that each of them support and depend on the development of products or
services that will work in conjunction with them. 13 Thus, the FCC must
remain aware of the entire Internet and information industries'
ecosystem, as its treatment of the physical layer will have important
ripple effects in the other layers. 14
As to broadband policy, a critical issue facing the FCC is whether it
should regulate access to broadband transmission facilities.' 5 The initial
debate on this score focused on the question of whether multiple
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") should be afforded "open access" to
cable broadband transmission facilities, but the issue goes beyond both
12. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REv. 534, 541-45 (2003) [hereinafter Weiser, The Internet] (explaining the four layers).
13. For an explanation and discussion of the significance of information platforms, see
Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, supra note 2, at 1, 3-8, and see also Philip J. Weiser,
Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822, 832-42
(2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Internet Governance] for an explaination of the significance of
concept and an outline of a strategy for regulation.
14. At least in the context of the digital TV transition, the FCC is acutely aware of the
"chicken and egg" relationship between the development of content, the deployment of physical
transmission facilities, and the adoption of customer premises equipment. See W. Kenneth
Ferree, Copyright Piracy Prevention and the Broadcast Flag, Statement Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (Mar. 6, 2003) ("One of the key pieces of the
puzzle-perhaps the key piece of the puzzle-is content. Consumers need a reason to invest in
the digital transition."), available at 2003 FCC LEXIS 1152; see also Digital Broadcast Copy
Protection, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 16,027 (Aug. 8, 2002) (seeking
comment on whether a regulatory copy protection regime is needed to support quality digital
programming).
15. For purposes of this Article, I will use the term "broadband transmission facilities" to refer
to all "last mile" broadband access platforms, including cable modems, DSL services, high speed
wireless services, or any other means of providing high speed connectivity.
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the treatment of cable facilities and the treatment of ISPs. In short, the
concern that motivates proponents of FCC action in this area is that, left
unchecked by some form of regulation, the physical layer providers of
broadband transmission will leverage their market power into the
logical, applications, and content layers.
The broadband access issue first arose as independent ISPs
challenged AT&T's merger with TCI, requesting that the FCC and local
franchising authorities impose an open access mandate that would allow
multiple-ISP access to cable facilities. 16 The FCC declined to address
this issue, arguing that "unregulation" avoided making quick and
potentially deleterious decisions about how to categorize a new
technology. 17 In refusing to make any decisions about how to
characterize the facilities used to carry Internet traffic, the FCC
abdicated its responsibility to set telecommunications policy, leaving it
to the courts to interpret the relevant statutory language and determine
18
what regulatory regime should govern broadband infrastructure.
Consequently, even the FCC's de facto policy of imposing no
obligations on cable providers failed when courts waded into the
vacuum with varying decisions. 19 Thus, when the Supreme Court

16. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999), rev'd, 216 F.3d
871 (9th Cir. 2000).
17. Former Chairman Kennard explained that this model of unregulation reflected "advice as
old as Western civilization itself: First do no harm-a high-tech Hippocratic Oath." William E.
Kennard, How To End the World Wide Wait, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1999, at A18 (emphasizing
the uncertain future development of the broadband market and stating that "[w]e cannot regulate
against problems that have yet to materialize in a market that has yet to develop"), available at
1999 WL-WSJ 24911090; cf Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 778 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that, in the fast-changing world of
telecommunications, judges should heed the admonition, "'First, do no harm"' (quoting the
Hippocratic oath)).
18. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, at 3066 (separate statement of Michael K.
Powell) ("The F.C.C. has stood back long enough, up until now making pronouncements in this
area in a piecemeal fashion."); Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes, and Cable
Open Access: Where the Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23, 55 (2001) ("Ironically, had the F.C.C. chosen to implement its
'hands off' policy through formal regulatory action, rather than through oblique pronouncements,
it might have avoided the series of conflicting judicial open access decisions that eventually
threatened the agency's ability to set broadband policy on a national basis."); cf Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Justice Souter recommends to the Court the precept, 'First do no harm.' The question,
though, is whether the harm is in sustaining the law or striking it down." (citation omitted)).
19. See GTE.Net LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal.
2002) ("There has been widespread and frustrating disagreement over the proper classification of
cable Internet service."). Compare, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th
Cir. 2000) (ruling that cable broadband Internet transport service is a "telecommunications," not
"cable" service), with MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir.
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addressed a related issue, Justice Thomas condemned the FCC's refusal
to classify cable broadband infrastructure, explaining that its
responsibility to administer the statute "does not permit the FCC to
avoid this question." 20 More significantly, the Ninth Circuit later
concluded that its own precedent-and not the ultimate FCC
determination-provides the authoritative interpretation of the statute,
thereby impeding 2 1the FCC's ability to implement its preferred
regulatory solution.
In 2002, the FCC finally commenced a set of proceedings to develop
22
a coherent and unified regulatory framework for the broadband era.
Even discounting for the overly optimistic hype, it seems clear that the
advent of broadband Internet access will change the Internet
significantly, facilitating a new series of applications for Internet
users. 23 The early results and conventional wisdom suggest that the
cable and telephone providers will dominate this market, with fixed
wireless and satellite offerings coming from behind. 24 Nonetheless, we
are still in the dawn of the broadband era, 2 5 as even though broadband

2001) (holding that cable broadband Internet transport involved "telecommunications facilities,"
but declining to classify service).
20. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 348-49 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(following a judicial interpretation of the Communications Act that differed from the FCC's
interpretation).
22. See, e.g., Cable Modem Order, supra note 3; Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3;
see also Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Broadband Technology Summit (Apr. 30, 2002) ("In
the last six months we have initiated several major broadband proceeding [sic] designed to clarify
the regulatory environment for new services and lower the costs and risks associated with
deployment of new infrastructure."), available at 2002 FCC LEXIS 2126.
23. For one such account, see Charles Platt, The Future Will Be Fast but Not Free, WIRED
(May 2001), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.05/broadbandpr.html
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2003).
24. Stephanie N. Mehta, How To Get BroadbandMoving Again, FORTUNE, Dec. 10, 2001, at
207 (suggesting that, in the broadband market, cable modems account for 70%, DSL for 28%,
and satellite about 1%), available at 2001 WL 26752947.
25. William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, The Principleof
Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation,
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 119 (noting that "most industry participants and observers would
agree that there is still more potential for enormous and rapid technological" advances in
broadband over the next decade); Jonathan R. Laing, Get Wired: Why Cable Will Beat the Bells in
the Race To Wire Your Home, BARRON'S, Aug. 20, 2001, at 23 (noting current usage).
The FCC offered the following observation on the deployment of broadband technologies:
It is widely believed that ubiquitous broadband deployment will bring valuable new
services to consumers, stimulate economic activity, improve national productivity, and
advance economic opportunity for the American public. The promise of broadband
generally, and the proliferation of broadband Internet access specifically, are fostering
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platforms are increasingly available, only a relatively small number of

all households subscribe to this technology (mostly through cable
modems or DSL).2 6 Particularly given its early stage of development,
the stakes of the FCC's decisions in this area are considerable, as they
will bear on the development of the markets for ISPs, Internet services
or applications, Internet content, and equipment that could work in
conjunction with broadband facilities (such as Wi-Fi enabled devices).

The difficulty in determining the proper regulatory treatment for
broadband reflects, at least in part, the fundamental difference in
technical architecture between broadband and narrowband Internet
access. In the narrowband ("dial-up") world, a user would make a
regular analog telephone call to an ISP, which would transform the
analog signals into digital and Internet-ready form. 27 The ISP would
then pass on the packets of data to an Internet Backbone Provider,
which would carry the data at high speeds toward its destination. In this
environment, the connection from the user to the ISP constituted plain
old telephone service, and the ISP constituted an unregulated
information service provider. 28 As such, the telephone companies could
the creation, adoption, and use of multimedia applications that can meet consumers'
broad communications, information, entertainment, and commercial needs and desires.
Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, para. 1; see also Cable Modem Order, supra note 3,
para. 30 ("[W]e are mindful that the broadband market in general and cable modem services in
particular are still evolving and that regulatory decisions will affect their development.").
26. Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 9 (citing, among other sources, Info. Tech. Ass'n
of Am., Building a Positive, Competitive Broadband Agenda: Positively Broadband, White Paper
(Oct. 2001), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/F.C.C.-02-77AI.txt
(last visited Dec. 20, 2001)); see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, para. 7 (2002) (finding that
7.8 million households subscribed to high-speed services). The Commission noted that "industry
analysts estimate[] that approximately 68% of residential broadband subscribers today use cable
modem service," 29% use DSL, and 3% use satellite or fixed wireless service. Cable Modem
Order, supra note 3, para. 9.
27. In particular, the FCC defined "Internet access services" as services that "alter the format
of information through computer processing applications such as protocol conversion and
interaction with stored data." Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, para. 33 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report] (internal quotations omitted); see
also Jason Oxman, The F.C.C. and the Unregulation of the Internet, 584 ANN. INST. ON

TELECOMM. POL'Y & REG. 231 (1999) (analogizing the role of the ISP in a narrowband world to
the role of an oil refinery: the telephone call came in an analog format, but the ISP's modem
banks would translate the call into a digital form that would then be passed on to the Internet).
28. For the FCC's explanation of this conclusion, see Universal Service Report, supra note 27,
para. 33. During the course of the AT&T consent decree, the FCC used the term "enhanced
services" and the district court administering the decree used the term "information services"; in
enacting the Telecom Act, Congress both displaced the role of the consent decree court and
instituted the "information services" term. See id. para. 39. Thus, except where referring to a
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not discriminate against ISPs or even differentiate calls to ISPs from
voice telephone calls. In the broadband world, however, the connection
from the user to the ISP is digital, Internet-ready, and high-speed from
the outset; moreover, this connection, in the case of cable providers at
least, often comes bundled with ISP service. This service, which did
not fall easily under any existing regulatory category, provided the FCC
with an opportunity to reconsider its regulatory strategy for the Internet
era.

29

Aside from the issue of mandated access to broadband facilities for
independent ISPs, there is another set of access issues related to Internet
services, content, and equipment. 30 Perhaps recognizing that mandating
multiple-ISP access to broadband facilities involves considerable
regulatory efforts that may not ultimately be worth the candle, some
advocacy groups and commentators have shifted their focus to these
other issues, grouping them collectively as "network neutrality"
issues. 3 1 Put in the context of the layered model of regulation, this
network neutrality model would insist on a nondiscrimination mandate
at the logical layer of the network, allowing proprietary firms to
maintain control over pricing and service offerings at the physical layer,
but not allowing them to use their control of the physical layer to distort
32
competition in the other layers.
III. THE USES AND ABUSES OF REGULATORY COMMON LAW:
FCC's ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AUTHORITY

UNDERSTANDING THE

To deal with the Internet-related issues discussed above, the FCC will
most likely rely on its ancillary jurisdiction authority. Unfortunately,
historical approach, this Article uses the modem "information services" and "information service
provider" terms in lieu of the "enhanced services" concept.
29. Id. para. 69 (leaving open whether broadband Internet access constitutes an "information
service").
30. See Tim Wu, Broadband Discrimination,Open Access and Network Neutrality, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
31. Tim Wu has explained effectively why, to the extent that multiple ISP access is a proxy
for broader concerns, the FCC is better off addressing those broader concerns-i.e., access to
Internet content and services--directly. See id.; see also Ex Parte Letter of Professors Tim Wu
and Lawrence Lessig, In re Inquiry Concerning High-speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities (Aug. 22, 2003) (outlining the case for such regulations), available at
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timewu/wu-lessig-fcc.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). Advocating a
similar course, the High Tech Broadband Coalition's comments to the FCC suggest a focus not
on multiple ISP access, but on "network neutrality." Comments of the High Tech Broadband
Coalition, In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Cable Facilities (No. 02-52), at http://www.unibex.com/ibx/users/GetComl/CIAJI/website/
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
32. See Philip J. Weiser, Regulatory Challenges and Models of Regulation, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter Weiser, Regulatory Models].
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the FCC's conception of this authority is hardly a model of clarity or
consistency. The FCC, for example, argued that it could go beyond the
specific regulations authorized by Congress regarding closed captioning
requirements, that it should not regulate Internet access markets, and
that it should regulate instant messaging. 33 In the case of Internet
access regulation, the FCC's lack of any decision over the course of
four years left the development of the appropriate regulatory regime to
the courts, thereby reversing the roles of the two institutions-i.e.,
leaving it to the FCC to review and act in the wake of judicial decisions.
In large part, the FCC's actions reflected its lack of any self-conscious
vision for its institutional role in the lawmaking system. Thus, before
explaining how the FCC should conceive of its ancillary jurisdiction
authority (particularly with respect to the Internet), this Part first
explains the legal framework for the FCC's development of the
Telecom Act's statutory policies.
The FCC, like other regulatory agencies, enjoys a privileged role in
the modem administrative state. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,3 4 regulatory agencies-and not
courts-are entrusted to determine the meaning of statutory terms
susceptible to more than one interpretation. 35 For courts accustomed to
the latitude that existed in the pre-Chevron era, this adjustment has not
always been an easy one. 36 In short, the Supreme Court's Chevron
decision reflects a judgment that, at least in most cases, agencies enjoy a
superior institutional competence to develop the principles embodied in

33. See Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,230,
para. 67 (2000) (mandating regulation of closed captioning above that prescribed by Congress),
rev'd, Motion Pictures Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Applications for
Consent to the Transfer of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and
American Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547,
para. 169 (2001) [hereinafter AOL Order] (regulating instant messaging); Kennard, supra note 17
(discussing the rationale for not regulating cable broadband access).
34. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (holding that
the Environmental Protection Agency reasonably construed the term "stationary source" as used
in the Clean Air Act).
35. See id. at 844 (concluding that courts are not permitted to substitute their own statutory
constructions for an agency's reasonable interpretation); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 74041 (1996) (commenting that the agency is assigned to interpret statutory provisions "first and

foremost").
36. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1715-18 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser,
Federal Common Law] (analogizing Chevron's limit on judicially made federal common law to
that effected by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-79 (1938)).
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regulatory statutes. 37 In Chevron itself, as well as in subsequent cases

and commentary, this judgment rests on some combination of political
sensitivity, subject matter expertise, or institutional competence.
Just recently, in Mead v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified

Chevron's rule of deference by explaining that it only applies when
38

Congress authorizes an agency to make rules "with the force of law."
Quite sensibly, Mead concluded that Congress envisions only that a
duly authorized agency action, whether through rulemaking or
adjudication, warrants judicial deference. 3 9 Put differently, Mead
reminds courts that Congress defines the scope of agency authority and
law courtsthat courts reviewing agency decisions-unlike common
40
do not possess the authority to make policy decisions.
To appreciate the importance of the Chevron regime, consider the
FCC's situation. As Justice Scalia recently underscored in AT&T Corp.
v. Iowa Utilities Board, the FCC enjoys broad authority to implement
each of the titles of its regulatory statute. 4 1 In particular, Justice Scalia
explained that the FCC's broad enabling authority allows it to develop
rules to serve the basic purposes of the Telecom Act, provided that
42
those rules are not inconsistent with any specific statutory provision.
In short, this explanation emphasized how agency-enabling statutes

37. See Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 926 (2003) ("we think that the best defenses of Chevron attempt to read ambiguous
congressional instructions in a way that is well-attuned to institutional considerations.").
38. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001) (holding "that Chevron left
Skidmore [v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944),] intact and applicable where statutory circumstances
indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such
authority was not invoked").
39. The Supreme Court long ago made clear that the FCC, like other agencies, can choose to
make regulatory policy through adjudication or rulemaking, provided that it conforms to basic
due process norms (i.e., an opportunity for notice and comment). See FCC. v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) ("'[A]dministrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge
their multitudinous duties.."" (citations omitted)). The exception to this rule is that section 205 of
the Communications Act requires a formal adjudication process for rate-setting decisions,
although not for any decision that can affect rates. See 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2000); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1126, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting limits of requirement); Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining requirement).
40. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
41. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999). In the Title II context, for
example, the FCC is authorized to "prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in
the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Provision." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000); see
also 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000) (authorizing the FCC, in the Title III context, to "[m]ake such
rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Chapter").
42. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 381.
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confer a 3"Necessary and Proper Clause"-like authority upon those
4
agencies.
To regulate outside of its direct mandate, the FCC must rely on its

"Title I" or "ancillary jurisdiction" authority. The justification for this
form of FCC action stems from a catch-all provision-contained in
Title I of the Communications Act-that authorizes the agency to
"perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders, not inconsistent with this Act as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions." 44 In United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., the Supreme Court interpreted this provision in particular and Title
I of the Communications Act (which sets forth the Act's basic mission)
in general as providing a broad scope of authority to the FCC.4 5
Consequently, the Southwestern Cable case upheld the FCC's
regulation of the cable television industry, even without any specific
statutory charge to do so, on the ground that its regulations were
"reasonably ancillary" to its assigned responsibilities to regulate
46
broadcasting.
The best conception of the FCC's Title I authority is as a cousin to
the interstitial authority of the federal courts to develop the basic
principles embodied in common law-like statutes such as the Sherman
Antitrust Act or the Copyright Act. 47 This common law-like authority
43. See Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 36, at 1753-54.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000); see also Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 44;
Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, supra note 33, at 15,276 (separate
statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell) ("It is important to emphasize that section 4(i) is
not a stand-alone basis of authority and cannot be read in isolation. It is more akin to a 'necessary
and proper' clause. Section 4(i)'s authority must be 'reasonably ancillary' to other express
provisions."); Rosemary C. Harold, Cable Open Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of 'Legacy'
Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 721, 783 (2001) (discussing the issue). To be sure, there are some
dissenters to the view that the Communications Act provides a broad grant of authority to the
FCC. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 517-519 (2002) (arguing that Title I's
provisions were mere "housekeeping measures" that should not be given substantive effect); cf.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 408 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that this broad authority-granting language in the Communications Act must be
limited by its context).
45. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968) ("Nothing in the
language of [Title I's description of the FCC's broad mission], in the surrounding language, or in
the Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those activities and forms of
communication that are specifically described by the Act's other provisions.").
46. Id. at 178.
47. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (discussing the common law
nature of Sherman Act decisions); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978) ("The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts
to give shape to the [Sherman Act's] broad mandate by drawing on its common-law tradition.");
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring)
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is not absolute with respect to both the FCC's regulatory responsibilities
and the judicial development of statutory regimes, but each provides

considerable room for policymaking discretion and creativity. In both
telecommunications regulation and copyright policy, for example,
Congress often chooses to defer action until seeing how the regulatory
or judicial approaches to cutting-edge issues work in practice. 48 The
key difference between these areas is that, with respect to
telecommunications regulation, Congress has concluded that regulatory
agencies-and not courts-are better situated to address the relevant
issues. 4 9 Nevertheless, in both cases, Congress can often produce better
results by refraining from legislating and letting common law decisions
govern the area because once Congress institutes its own legal regime, it
50
will be unlikely to change it even if it is erroneous.
In the thirty-five years since the Supreme Court decided
Southwestern Cable, the FCC has yet to develop a clear vision for its
common law-like authority. 5 1 In the case of cable regulation, the FCC2
5
proceeded to develop a regulatory regime of its own making.
Consequently, Congress did not specify its own regime of regulation
until 1984, when it finally added a cable-specific title, Title VI, to the

(explaining that "the heart of copyright doctrine-what may be protected and with what
limitations and exceptions-has been developed by the courts through experience with individual
cases"), affd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). In the case of the antitrust laws, the development of the law
reflects not only judicial creativity, but also the influence of the Federal Trade Commission and
the antitrust division of the Department of Justice. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of AntitrustLaw, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,
663 (1982) ("By adopting a common-law approach, Congress in effect delegated [much] of its
lawmaking power to the judicial branch," which, in turn, is influenced by Department of Justice
policy.).
48. See Weiser, Regulatory Models, supra note 32, at 11.
49. For a classic articulation of this view by one of the notable proponents of the
administrative state, see JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1974). For a recent
dissent by a proponent of judicial lawmaking and critic of agency lawmaking, see PETER HUBER,
LAW AND DISORDER INCYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE F.C.C. AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE
TELECOSM (1997).
50. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purposes (commenting, with respect to the FCC's role, that "with each passing era
[the FCC's statutory charter] is beginning to look more like a 'living constitution' than a fixed
statutory mandate"), in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 24
(Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law
in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 310-12 (2002) (making this argument for judicial
decisions).
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (highlighting the FCC's inconsistent
positions).
52. See supra notes 44-46 (commenting on the breadth of authority granted to the FCC by the
Communications Act).

2003]

Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy

Communications Act.5 3 Aside from developing regulations for cable
television, the FCC has employed its Title I authority on rare occasions,
leaving unanswered a series of questions about its scope. 54 More
generally, administrative law scholars have not focused on how to
analyze agency efforts to resolve policy issues that are addressed by
common law-like approaches. 5 5 Thus, the FCC's current understanding
of its Title I authority comes largely from its regulation of cable
television before the enactment of Title VI, where the courts upheld the
Commission's rules when they related to the Commission's charge to
regulate broadcasting, but invalidated them when they strayed from that
56
role.
Unfortunately, the FCC sometimes looks at its Title I authority as a
set of suspenders to use in addition to its belt when justifying actions
contemplated by specific statutory mandates. A notorious recent
example of this approach is Motion Picture Association of America v.
FCC,57 in which the D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's reliance on its Title
53. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2279
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
54. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding the
FCC's pre-statutory version of the universal service fund as part of its ancillary jurisdiction); N.
Am. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Section 4(i) empowers
the Commission to deal with the unforeseen-even if... that means straying a little way beyond
the apparent boundaries of the Act---4o the extent necessary to regulate effectively those matters
already within the boundaries."); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (stating that the FCC properly "exercise[d] the residual authority contained in Section
154(i) to require a tariff filing" because it "properly perceived the need for close supervision"
with respect to interconnection).
55. For a treatment of this issue, see Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 36, at 175360; John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REV. 113, 199
(1998) (discussing the role of enabling legislation in Chevron doctrine); see also Nat'l Cable
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 328 (2002) ("[T]he subject matter here is
technical, complex, and dynamic; and, as a general rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps
where statutes are silent." (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984))); Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 398 (1969) (stating that not to
give the FCC latitude in meeting new problems in communications markets "would place an
intolerable regulatory burden on the Congress--one which it sought to escape by delegating
administrative functions to the Commission").
56. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (concluding that rules requiring cable companies to produce original programming
"strain outer limits" of "open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction"). Compare United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 181 (1968) (upholding the FCC's authority to regulate
cable television), and United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(upholding FCC's authority to reinstate syndicated exclusivity rules for cable television
companies as ancillary to the Commission's authority to regulate television broadcasting), with
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-09 (1979) (invalidating public access mandates
on cable systems as a form of common carriage regulation unrelated to the Commission's mission
or authority to regulate broadcasting).
57. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

54
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I authority to justify going further in its own regulations than
contemplated by the specific directive crafted by Congress. 5 8 In so
doing, the FCC failed to appreciate that its broad common law-like
authority applies only where it can take an action that is consistent with
the regime specified by Congress and reasonably ancillary to the goals
set forth in the statute. 59 Or, as the Supreme Court put it, this authority
only enables the Commission to act when "necessary
to ensure the
' 60
achievement of [its] statutory responsibilities. "
IV.

BROADBAND POLICY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

In order to rationalize the regulatory structure governing broadband
transmission, the FCC faces a series of difficult questions. At the
outset, it confronts the basic legal question of what regulatory
framework should authorize and guide its oversight of broadband
Internet transmission. More generally, the FCC's challenge is to
develop a principled, legally sustainable framework that governs all
modes of broadband transmission (e.g., cable modems, telephone lines,
wireless, etc.).

58. Id. at 805 ("The F.C.C.'s position seems to be that the adoption of rules mandating video
description is permissible because Congress did not expressly foreclose the possibility. This is an
entirely untenable position."). To underscore its point, the D.C. Circuit quoted from thenCommissioner Michael Powell's dissenting position on why section 4(i), without more, does not
"give the agency authority to promulgate the disputed rules cannot withstand scrutiny":
It is important to emphasize that section 4(i) is not a stand-alone basis of authority and
cannot be read in isolation. It is more akin to a "necessary and proper" clause. Section
4(i)'s authority must be "reasonably ancillary" to other express provisions. And, by its
express terms, our exercise of that authority cannot be "inconsistent" with other
provisions of the Act. The reason for these limitations is plain: Were an agency
afforded carte blanche under such a broad provision, irrespective of subsequent
congressional acts that did not squarely prohibit action, it would be able to expand
greatly its regulatory reach.
Id. at 806 (quoting Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, supra note 31,
at 15,276 (separate statement of Michael K. Powell)). Then-Commissioner Powell offered a
similar criticism of the FCC's rationale for imposing rules governing handicapped accessibility to
telecommunications services based on a Title I that called for regulations above and beyond those
deemed mandated by the specific statutory provision. See Implementing Sections 255 and
251(A)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417, 6545 (1999) (separate statement of Michael K. Powell) (explaining that
such "an unrestrained application of ancillary jurisdiction authority has [not] been sanctioned by
the courts" or FCC precedents).
59. Motion PictureAss'n of Am., 309 F.3d at 806.
60. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 706.
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A.

Classificationof BroadbandTransmission as a Title H
or Title I Service

Simplifying matters considerably, the basic legal structure of the
Telecom Act presents the FCC with the question of whether Internet
broadband transmission should be regulated under Title II or Title I of
the Act. 6 1 To follow the Title II route, the FCC would (1) classify
broadband transmission as a "telecommunications service"; 62 and (2)
regulate broadband transmission bundled with Internet access by
requiring providers to "strip out" the "telecommunications service"
component and provide it on an unbundled basis as a regulated Title II
service. This course is essentially the one that the FCC took with
respect to incumbent telephone providers under the Computer
Inquiries.63 To pursue the Title I route, the FCC would regulate

broadband transmission as (1) an "information service" 64 (when

61. Another option, which the FCC declined to consider, would be to regulate broadband as an
"advanced telecommunications capability" under Section 706 of the Telecom Act. See Cable
Modem Order, supra note 3, paras. 70-71 ("Because we have found that cable modem service fits
within the statutory definition of an information service, we need not consider whether we have
the authority to create a new category of service."); see also Jim Chen, The Authority To Regulate
BroadbandInternet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 711-12 (2001) (urging this
approach). But see Ass'n of Communications Enters. v. FCC, 235 F.3d 662, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(noting that the FCC determined that "advanced services are telecommunications like any
others"). Finally, the FCC could have treated broadband transport over cable as a "cable service,"
but this approach would have stretched greatly the concept of cable service. See Cable Modem
Order, supra note 3, paras. 60-68; see also AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877
(9th Cir. 2000) ("[Alpplying the carefully tailored scheme of cable television regulation to cable
broadband Internet access would lead to absurd results ....).
62. The Act defines "telecommunications service" as "the offering of telecommunications for
a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). Because the definition
envisions an offering held out to the public, such offerings are labeled as common carrier-as
opposed to private carrier-offerings. See Cable and Wireless, PLC, Application for a License to
Land and Operate in the United States a Private Submarine Fiber Optic Cable, 12 F.C.C.R. 8516,
paras. 12-14 (1997) ("The legislative history of the 1996 Act indicates that the definition of
telecommunications services is intended to clarify that telecommunications services are common
carrier services.").
63. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission's Computer
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 194 (2003): see also infra notes 113-16 and accompanying
text (discussing the Computer Inquiries).
64. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining "information service" as "the offering of a
capacity for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications"). To the extent that the statute left the
issue open to dispute, the FCC clarified that a service must be classified as either a
"telecommunications service" or an "information service," but that it cannot be both. See
Universal Service Report, supra note 27, para. 39. The Ninth Circuit, however, appears to have
concluded differently. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
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bundled with Internet access) and (2) "private65carriage"-as opposed to
"common carriage"-when provided to ISPs.

The practical difference between the Title I and the Title II route is
that the latter implicates a set of legacy regulations. Thus, unlike Title
II's basic premise that legacy regulations of telephone service would
apply, a Title I-based regime begins from the premise that no regulation
applies and that the FCC can develop any reasonable regulations that
are ancillary to its statutory mandate. But because the FCC can forbear
from applying inappropriate Title II regulations, 66 the relevant
difference between the two regimes can be understood as beginning
65. There is a long line of authority that governs when the provision of "telecommunications"
must be classified as a "telecommunications service"-as opposed to "private carriage"-and
subject to "common carier" regulation. See Virgin Is. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (upholding ruling that "telecommunications services" equates with "common
carriage"); Nat'l Assoc. of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(stating that the test focuses on whether the "operator offer[s] service to whatever public its
service may legally and practically be of use"); see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19
F.3d 1475, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining consequences of classification decision). Insofar as
broadband providers sell broadband transport to ISPs and not to the public, the FCC has
suggested that such transactions are to be treated as private carriage. See Cable Modem Order,
supra note 3, para. 54 (concluding that "to the extent AOL Time Warner is providing a standalone telecommunications offering to EarthLink or other ISPs, we conclude that the offering
would be a private carrier service and not a common carrier service"); see also Wireless
Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, para. 25 (suggesting that classification of the
telecommunications-and not "telecommunications service" (i.e., common carriage)component of information service is a "logical extension" of the conclusion that bundled offering
is "information service").
66. In recognizing the possibility of this course of action, the Commission asked for comment
on the issue. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 50. Under the Telecom Act, the FCC
may forbear from regulation if it determines that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that
telecommunications carrier or that telecommunications, service are just and reasonable
and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection
of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the
public interest.
47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000). Under related authority, the Commission has decided to forebear
from imposing a number of otherwise applicable regulations governing wireless carriers. See
Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, GN Docket No. 93-252,
Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, paras. 123-219 (1994) (relieving wireless providers
from tariff and entry and exit requirements), recon. dismissed in part and denied in part, 15
F.C.C.R. 5231 (Mar. 10, 2000). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in its AT&T v. City of Portland
decision, suggested that the FCC would need to consider whether forebearance would be proper
in the wake of its conclusion that cable modems constitute a telecommunications service. See
City of Portland,216 F.3d at 879-80; see also Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 34 n.219
("Although we do not forbear from Title II regulation (to the extent other jurisdictions seek to
apply it) on this record, we do tentatively conclude that such regulation would not be appropriate
and that we should forbear from it."); id. paras. 94-95 (inquiring about forbearance).
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with an open field and building upwards or beginning with a structure in
place and renovating it downwards.
The FCC's initial regime for regulating broadband transmission
provided by telephone networks (i.e., DSL connections) adopted the
Title II strategy. 67 In particular, the FCC applied the Computer Inquiry
rules to require the telephone companies to unbundle DSL from Internet
access and provide ISPs with access to broadband transmission. By
contrast, as noted earlier, the FCC's strategy as to cable broadband
networks initially involved making no decision, thereby triggering a set
of inconsistent judicial rulings. 68 In its Cable Modem Order, however,
the FCC finally adopted the Title I strategy for cable modem services
based on two basic judgments: first, that broadband Internet access is an
"information service;" and second, that cable providers should not be
69
subject to the unbundling demands of the Computer Inquiries.
In a recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that envisions a reform of
broadband policy, the FCC suggested that it intends to regulate all
broadband platforms similarly 70 and to regulate broadband transmission
over telephone lines under Title 1.71 This approach, however, envisions
treating broadband platforms differently from other information
services, such as voicemail, because the FCC indicated its willingness
to consider regulating access to them. 72 To implement this approach,
which would depart from its past decisions, the FCC will need to

67. See In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, Second Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,237, para. 21 (1999)
(deeming bulk DSL services sold to an ISP to be subject to common carriage regulation); GTE
Telephone Operating Cos., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,466, para. 16
(1998) (accepting filing of DSL tariff as an interstate telecommunications service); see also
Independent Data Communications Manufacturers Association., Inc., Petition for Declaratory
Ruling That AT&T's InterSpan Frame Relay Service Is a Basic Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,717,
para. 40 (1995) (deeming AT&T's frame relay service to be within Title II).
68. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC's initial policy of
"unregulation" regarding broadband access).
69. Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 95 (classifying cable modem service as an
"information service" under Title I).
70. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, para. 4 ("[Tlhe Commission's regulatory
framework will conceptualize broadband to include any and all platforms capable of fusing
communications power, computing power, high-bandwidth intensive content, and access to the
Internet.").
71. Id. paras. 19-20.
72. See id. paras. 43-49. The FCC considered classic information services, such as voicemail,
as "an incremental extension of the existing narrowband telecommunications network" in that
they built upon the existing network. Id. para. 13; see also Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 4289, para. 7 n.l I (1999) (describing information services as employing the "existing
telephone network to deliver services that provide more than a basic transmission offering").
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explain how competition in the broadband marketplace-or other
in its earlier decisions--call for a different
factors not considered
73
regulatory strategy.
B. Ancillary JurisdictionIssues Posed by Classifying Broadband
as a Title I Service
In commencing its broadband rulemaking proceedings, the
Commission signaled its preference for the Title I strategy of
developing a new regulatory regime for the broadband environment.
This approach offers the Commission more leeway and opportunity for
creativity and precision, as it would not begin with the legacy legal
requirements that are traditionally imposed on telecommunications
carriers. Nonetheless, the Title I strategy, which enables the FCC to
evaluate what requirements would be appropriate to impose under its
ancillary jurisdiction authority, 74 comes with a series of risks and
challenges associated with blazing a new trail. In particular, the FCC's
approach requires it to establish that (1) its classification decision is
legally sustainable; and (2) under Title I, it is authorized to develop
substantive regulations for broadband platforms.
Under usual circumstances, the decision by the FCC to classify
broadband Internet access as an "information service" would be a close
call that rests within its discretion to make. In evaluating the issue in
the cable modem context, the FCC concluded that because cable
companies typically do not sell to the public unaltered broadband
transmission, broadband Internet access constitutes an "information
service" and does not contain a "telecommunications service." To
challenge the "information service" classification, some parties argued
that this approach threatens to eviscerate Title II and is akin to allowing
a telephone company which sells plain old telephone service bundled
75
with an integrated voicemail product to avoid the strictures of Title 11.
Stated differently, the "broadband as 'telecommunications services'
73. See AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the FCC
must explain changes in regulatory policy). Indeed, past FCC decisions have changed the
regulatory treatment of certain services-based on market conditions-from a Title II to a Title I
approach. See Pub. Serv. Comm. of Md. v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(discussing change in regulatory treatment of billing and collection services); Policies and Rules
Concerning Local Exchange Carrier Validation and Billing Information for Joint Use Calling
Cards, 7 F.C.C.R. 3528, para. 26 n.50 (1992) (discussing regulatory treatment of billing and
collection services).
74. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
75. Cf In re Indep. Data Communications Mfrs. Ass'n, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,717 (Oct. 18, 1995)
(ruling that AT&T's frame relay service, which relied on protocol processing to enhance the
service, constituted a common carrier service).
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argument" rejects the position that a "telecommunications" component
can exist outside "telecommunications services." 76 In the Cable Modem
Order, the FCC rejected that position, concluding that the regulatory
separation of bundled services-as the Computer Inquiry rules mandate
where applicable-would involve an intrusive oversight of
technologically advanced services that might77 well stall innovation and
mire the agency in administrative challenges.
Because the FCC's determination followed a lengthy period of
indecision, its classification decision faced a number of unique hurdles.
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit initially addressed the issue before
as
a
broadband
transmission
did,
classifying
the FCC
telecommunications service. 7 8 Consequently, upon reviewing the
FCC's classification of cable modem services in Brand X Internet
Services v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit rejected the FCC's decision and
explained that its earlier ruling meant that, under the Chevron doctrine,
it does not accord deference to the later FCC ruling-concluding, in
effect, that the agency waived its deference by allowing the court to
address the issue first. 79 Assuming that the FCC overcomes this ruling
(either upon an en banc or Supreme Court review of the matter), it must
also establish that the relevant statutory terms are ambiguous and that its
interpretation of them is reasonable. Although those hurdles present
significant challenges (as suggested by the fact that Judge Thomas'
concurrence maintains that there is no room for FCC discretion on this
issue), 80 the thorny classification issue presented by broadband
platforms would appear to be just the sort of difficult judgment call that
Chevron reserves for agencies and not courts. To be sure, the FCC
could simply retreat from its earlier Title I strategy and opt for a Title II

76. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[N]othing suggests that telecommunications services ceased to be so when offered
to the public along with an information service."). The one exception to this principle would be
for a company's private network, as all agree that it cannot be deemed a "telecommunications
service" within the scope of Title II. Id.
77. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 43 (rejecting invitation "to find a
telecommunications service inside every information service, extract it, and make it a stand-alone
offering to be regulated under Title II of the Act."); see also In re SBC Communications, Inc., 16
F.C.C.R. 20,719, 20,888 (2001) (statement of Commissioner Abernathy) ("The mere fact that
such services are offered 'via telecommunications' cannot suffice to render such services
'telecommunications services."').
78. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000).
79. BrandX, 345 F.3d at 1132.
80. Judge Thomas suggested that there is no possible ambiguity as to whether broadband
constitutes a "telecommunications service." Id. at 1134.
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forbearance model, but Chairman
Powell's pronouncement on the topic
81
suggests that course is unlikely.
Even assuming that the FCC prevails in its efforts to classify
broadband transmission under Title I, it still will face serious questions
as to whether Title I authorizes the FCC to regulate broadband
platforms-even with a minimal regulatory touch. Unlike previous
regulations based on its Title I authority, the FCC's potential regulation
of access to broadband platforms does not neatly fit as "reasonably
ancillary" to the Commission's traditional statutory responsibilities. In
its rules governing cable television, for example, the FCC could explain
easily how its regulations over the importation of distant broadcast
stations via cable television into a local broadcaster's service area
related to its mandate to regulate television broadcasting. 82 By contrast,
the FCC's conclusion that broadband Internet access does not contain a
"telecommunications service" makes it more difficult to explain how
any attendant regulations of this "information service" are ancillary to a
regulatory category provided by the Act. 83 In its proposed rulemaking,
the FCC suggests that its general mandate to oversee "advanced
services" and pursue their rollout-as opposed to any specific authority

over, say, voice telephone service-justifies its oversight of broadband

81. Statement of FCC Chairman Michael Powell on Ninth Circuit Cable Modem Decision
(Oct. 6, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC239558A1.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
82. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1968) (concluding that
regulatory authority over cable operators was imperative for the FCC's performance of its
statutory mission over broadcasting, noting that "Congress has imposed upon the Commission the
'obligation of providing a widely dispersed radio and television service' with a 'fair, efficient,
and equitable distribution' of services among the 'several states and communities."' (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 307) (citation omitted)).
83. See, e.g., id. at 178 (holding that Title I authority is restricted to areas "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities");
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 1475, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Title I authority is
"restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [the Commission's] various
responsibilities under titles I and HI of the Act"); California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240 n.35
(9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that Title I jurisdiction "confers on the FCC only such power as is
ancillary to the Commission's specific statutory responsibilities" and that "[i]n the case of
enhanced services, the specific responsibility to which the Commission's Title I authority is
ancillary [is] to its Title II authority").
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transmission. 84 This argument is both untested85and quite novel, so it is
unclear whether reviewing courts will accept it.
To justify its novel use of its Title I authority, the Commission needs
to explain that the development of a broadband Internet presents a
paradigm shift for communications regulation. The broadband Internet,
like traditional communications technology such as the telephone
network and cable television, will carry voice conversations (IP
telephony) and video programming (video streaming).
But the
Internet's characteristics-most notably the TCP/IP standard's ability to
facilitate voice and video communications on different physical
platforms-may ultimately marginalize existing communications
policies. 8 6 Rather than mapping and adjusting the scope of current
policies onto the Internet, the development of a new regime pursuant to
Title I can ensure that the Internet will prosper and compete with
existing media without being encumbered by legacy regulations that
87
may not be appropriate.
On this approach, the Commission would define its oversight of the
Internet by reference to its need to regulate "information platforms" that
can support the delivery of voice, video, and text applications. In the
old communications environment, content-say, voice conversations or
video programming-would be carried by the same company that
provides the "wire" or "air" communications platform. By contrast, in

84. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, paras. 75-79; see also 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)
(directing the FCC to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans... by utilizing... measures that promote
competition in the local telecommunications market"); Promotion of Competitive Networks in
Local Telecommunications Markets, 16 F.C.C.R. 7064, para. 103 (2000) (justifying Title I
authority with reference to this section).
85. Commissioner Abernathy's separate statement implicitly recognized this point:
"I encourage commenters to provide detailed arguments on our statutory authority to
impose a cable access requirement ....
I note that while the Commission relied on
that provision [section 4(i)] in adopting the Computer Inquiry requirements, there may
be a greater nexus between those requirements and the provisions of Title II than exists
between a cable access requirement and other affirmative grants of authority."
Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, at 4868 n.2 (separate statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy).
86. See, e.g., Brigitte Greenberg, FCC Chooses To Watch and Wait as VOIP Slowly Moves
Forward, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 29, 2002 (noting "that industry analysts predict VolP [Voiceover-IP] eventually will compete and perhaps overtake circuit-switched telephony delivered by
CLECs"), available at LEXIS, News Group File.
87. See, e.g., Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Bringing Regulatory Certainty to the Broadband Arena,
Remarks at the Alliance for Public Technology and High-Tech Broadband Coalition Policy
Breakfast (June 28, 2002) ("[A] Title I approach has the benefit of allowing the Commission to
adopt a flexible and narrowly targeted regulatory regime, rather than the heavy-handed approach
associated with common carrier regulation under Title II."), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Abernathy/2002/spkqa215.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
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the Internet environment, content is not necessarily delivered by the
provider of the physical facilities, but via applications offered by other
companies-such as the software necessary to provide Internet
telephony or instant messaging, for example-that depend on access to
88
the Internet's logical and physical layers.
For this important reason, broadband Internet access differs from
traditional information services (like voicemail) in that it is not merely
the use of computing power to produce a service on a
telecommunications platform. 89 Put in the context of the voicemail
example, it is hard to imagine that any provider would press for
"unbundled access" to a voicemail product to develop a complementary
offering. In the context of broadband Internet access, however, "the
capabilities made possible by broadband facilities enable the
deployment of new, bandwidth-intensive, multimedia information
services, which in turn drive the use and further development of
broadband capable facilities." 90 In short, the old forms of "information
services" were the end products used by consumers; in the broadband
world, new "information services"-such as broadband access itself,
but also other applications (like instant messaging)-will constitute the
platform upon which providers will rely to offer their Internet-delivered
content and services.
The Commission's broadband proceedings suggest that it is interested
in crafting a new regulatory regime for the Internet era based on its Title
I authority. 9 1 In so doing, it can develop a regulatory model that
Congress can later endorse or reject, following the course that the
Commission took in regulating cable television in the absence of an
explicit statutory mandate. 92 Indeed, given that the Telecom Act only

88. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (noting the relationship between physical
and logical layers).
89. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, para. 31 (stating that the Computer
Inquiries regime "was constructed to accomplish certain goals in a world in which the services at
issue were more akin to voicemail and other narrowband applications, rather than to broadband
Internet access").
90. Id. para. 13.
91. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, paras. 44-57; Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra
note 3, para. 50 (asking whether reliance on voluntary market transactions would be sufficient or
whether the Commission should mandate the sale of broadband transmission on a
nondiscriminatory basis).
92. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 70 (statement of Chairman Powell). For a
discussion of this history, see Kathy L. Cooper, The Cable Industry: Regulation Revisited in the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

109, 110-13 (1993).
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faintly anticipated the rise of the Internet, 9 3 the need for such a strategy
is not surprising.
C. Limiting Principlesfor BroadbandRegulation Under Title I
Ancillary Jurisdiction
In order to withstand judicial scrutiny, the Commission must develop
a limiting standard to contain the reach of its authority over the Internet.
Historically, the "information services" classification signaled a policy
of regulatory forbearance. 94 By contrast, using its Title I authority to
regulate broadband Internet access as an information service would
undermine this policy and raise the question of what principle would
95
limit the expansion of the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction in this area.
Thus, if the Commission fails to explain how information platforms
play a crucial role in delivering the content heretofore delivered directly
by cable and the telephone network, the courts may conclude that the
Commission's effort to regulate such platforms exceeds its jurisdiction.
In GTE Services Corp. v. FCC, for example, the Second Circuit
invalidated the FCC's rule regarding the use of a common carrier's
name on its information services affiliate because this regulation did not
relate to communications and thus constituted an impermissible
extension of the FCC's authority. 96 By contrast, the courts upheld the
FCC's decision to preempt state regulation of information services and
inside wiring under its Title I authority, but only where doing so was
necessary to advance the FCC's goals. 97 In short, for a regulatory
measure enacted under Title I to withstand judicial review, it must relate
closely to an express statutory policy.
93.

COMPUTER

SCIENCE

AND

TELECOMM.

BOARD,

NAT'L

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

BROADBAND: BRINGING HOME THE BITS 24 (2002) ("The present policy framework for

broadband, which revolves around the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is problematic and is
unsuited in several respects to the new era of broadband services."); Barbara Esbin, Internet over
Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 42 (1999)

("[T]he 1996 Act's primary approach to communications services, service providers and facilities
neither fully reflects nor anticipates the impact of Internet-based communications capabilities on
existing networks and the regulatory regimes that govern them .... ").
94. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
information services "have never been subject to regulation").
95. See AOL Order, supra note 33, at 6712 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Powell)
(noting that, without a limiting principle to govern the extension of Commission regulation, the
FCC's willingness to regulate instant messaging suggests the development of a regulatory regime
that will "regulate chat rooms, e-mail services, peer-to-peer services such as Napster, and even
the Internet browser market").
96. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1972).
97. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 931-33 (9th Cir. 1994) (limiting state regulation of
information services); Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (limiting state regulations of inside wiring).
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One effective limiting standard for the FCC's reliance on Title I
authority to regulate broadband platforms would focus on whether the
information platform at issue delivered voice, video, or data
communications that are reasonably likely to substitute for a service
regulated under the FCC's existing regulatory mission. 9 8 Significantly,
99
this standard would rule out any FCC regulation of the content layer.
As to regulations of the applications, logical, and physical layers-or of
equipment that would work in conjunction with any of the above-the
presence or absence of the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction would depend
on the actual marketplace facts. Instant messaging technology, for
example, would only be subject to Title I regulation based on a showing
of its reasonable substitutability for a currently regulated information
platform technology. l0 0 To adopt a more lenient standard would allow
the FCC leeway in expanding its regulatory mission without clear
statutory guidance. But the reasonable substitutability test provides
clear direction to the FCC while enabling it to regulate new
technologies that substitute for old ones-say, instant messaging or
Internet telephony-and thus enables it to adapt its regulations to
marketplace developments. By providing it with this authority, the FCC
will not be forced to fit new technology into old regulatory categories
and will be able to address competition policy problems arising from
new technological developments in a narrowly tailored and appropriate

manner.
Finally, an important benefit of the information platforms-based
justification for Title I regulation is that such an approach would help
98. This standard is consistent with the more general approach taken by the FCC. See
Promotion of Competitive Networks, 15 F.C.C.R. 22,983, para. 101 (2000) (finding that legal
authority under Title I depends on whether the absence of regulation in question "effectively
hinders" achievement of a statutory goal and the action is "reasonably ancillary" to fulfilling the
charge of an express statutory provision).
99. This policy follows the state of the FCC's existing regulatory mandate, with the notable
exception of broadcast regulation, which sanctions the regulation of content on the theory that the
relevant information platform is a scarce resource managed by the government. See Nat'l Broad.
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (explaining that the FCC enjoys authority not only
to issue licenses for the use of spectrum, but also to oversee how that spectrum is used); see also
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (upholding scarcity rationale). This
rationale, as I and others have observed, is suspect and ripe for revision. See Phil Weiser,
PromotingInformed Deliberation and a FirstAmendment Doctrinefor a DigitalAge: Towards a
New Regulatory Regime for Broadcast Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
MEDIA 11, 12-13 (Chambers and Costain eds., 2000); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity,
Rent Seeking and the FirstAmendment, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 944 (1997).
100. In announcing its regulation of instant messaging as part of its approval of the merger of
American Online and Time Warner, the FCC relied on a more relaxed standard, simply
announcing that, as a form of communication, it must have jurisdiction. See AOL Order, supra
note 33, para. 148.
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immunize the regulatory regime against First Amendment challenges.
Over the years, the courts have scrutinized the FCC's imposition of
access obligations with particular care where the Commission provided
access to "speakers" as opposed to "common carriers." 10 1 By choosing
not to classify broadband transmission as "telecommunications," which
is recognized as connoting no speaking rights, the FCC will have to
explain why First Amendment rights do not constrain its ability to
impose rights on an "information service provider," which is generally
treated as a speaker. By explaining the significance of information
platforms, even if they are not regulated as common carriers per se, the
Commission can signal to courts that such regulations do not reflect
preferences among types of speech-or even speakers-but rather that
they serve to address market failures in a dynamic industry
environment.
V. BROADBAND POLICY AND AN ANTITRUST-LIKE MODEL OF
REGULATION

The broadband era and the opportunity for the FCC to rely on its
Title I authority to develop new strategies for telecommunications
regulation may well mark the beginning of the FCC's development of a
next generation regulatory regime.
In the old environment,
characterized by the Computer Inquiry rules, 10 2 the FCC regulated
monopoly telephone companies to facilitate the development of new
"information services," such as "dial-a-joke" and dial-up Internet
access. 103 For such cases, these services might not have been developed
or deployed in an effective manner without the cooperation of the local
monopoly telephone provider. Moreover, as underscored by "Baxter's
Law," 1°4 the fact that prices for using the telephone network were
heavily regulated created an incentive for telephone companies to
leverage their market power from the telecommunications market into
adjacent markets. But as noted above, the broadband marketplace
differs from the traditional environment in several ways, creating the

101. See, e.g., Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F.
Supp. 2d 685, 693 (S.D. Fla. 2000) ("The cable operator, unlike a telephone service, does not sell
transmission but instead offers a collection of content.").
102. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Computer Inquiry rules).
103. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, para. 36 ("[Tlhe core assumption
underlying the 'Computer Inquiries' was that the telephone network is the primary, if not
exclusive, means through which information service providers can gain access to their
customers.").
104. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (defining Baxter's Law).
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This Part outlines a new model of regulating access in the broadband
environment. Under Title II's traditional model of common carriage
regulation, companies face proactive limits on how they could operate.
By contrast, this Part outlines how the FCC can rely on its Title I
authority to employ a reactive, antitrust-like model of regulation for the
emerging broadband market, which faces no price regulation and has
the potential for rival platforms to compete vigorously with one another.
In short, this model would allow parties to develop their own business
arrangements as they saw fit, subject only to an after-the-fact scrutiny of
discriminatory conduct alleged to lack a redeeming efficiency
justification.
A. The Law and Economics of Open Access Policies
For more than thirty-five years, "open access" defined a large set of
policies adopted and implemented by the FCC and antitrust courts. This
era began with the landmark Carterfone decision, in which the FCC
concluded that AT&T-then a vertically-integrated monopoly-could
10 6
not thwart the attachment of customer premises equipment ("CPE")
to the wireline telephone network. 10 7 Famously, the FCC's Carterfone
decision spawned a set of rules that regulated the ability of incumbent
telephone providers to prevent "foreign devices" from connecting to the
telephone network and framed an ongoing debate regarding the role of
telecommunications regulation in ensuring "open access" to the
telecommunications network. 10 8
These rules, which govern the
equipment that can be used in connection with the telecommunications
network, were ultimately upheld as a legitimate use of the FCC's Title I
authority.109

105. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing how the attributes of the
broadband market may not be adequately addressed by prior regulatory approaches).
106. Customer premises equipment refers to any equipment that "attaches" to the wireline
telephone network, including telephones, modems, and private branch exchanges ("PBXs").
107. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 42425 (1968). This decision arose from an antitrust action brought by the developers of the
Carterfone against AT&T, as the district court referred the issues related to AT&T's tariff to the

FCC for decision. See Carter v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 F. Supp. 188, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1966),
aff'd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
108. For a discussion of the relevant events, see Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664
F.2d 716, 723-25 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the argument
that Congress neither foresaw this use of FCC power nor had explicit statutory authorization to
mandate such regulations).
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In the wake of the Carterfone decision, the FCC developed a
regulatory regime that sports an intimidating set of legal and economic
concepts. Thus, before discussing .the possibilities for a next generation
regulatory regime, it is important to understand the basics of the
regulatory regime initiated by Carterfone. This Section first discusses
the legal underpinnings of this regime and then reflects on its economic
justifications.
1. The Legal World Created by Carterfone and Its Progeny
To appreciate the formidable regulatory regime developed since
Carterfone, it is important to understand the different facets of open
access policy. In particular, the concept of "open access" actually
encompasses three distinct but related forms of regulation: (1)
compatibility, (2) unbundling, and (3) interconnection. I will discuss
each in turn.
First, as in Carterfone, open access can involve compatibility
requirements that ensure that a complementary product is interoperable
with a basic platform. At first, AT&T complied with Carterfone's
mandate by filing tariffs requiring a "protective coupling arrangement"
to mediate between the network and any foreign devices.1 10 But after a
number of CPE developers challenged this action, both at the FCC and
in antitrust actions, the FCC imposed a "terminal equipment registration
program," which became known as the Part 68 rules.I 1 This program
required that all CPE-including equipment manufactured by AT&Tbe certified by the FCC as compliant with certain compatibility
1 12
requirements.
Closely related to the FCC's pro-competitive regulation of the
equipment market was its regulation of "information services," which
use data processing technology and access to the telecommunications
network to produce an array of product offerings ranging from Dial-AJoke to LexisNexis to dial-up Internet access. To facilitate competition
110. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 799 n.15 (2d Cir. 1983)
(quoting AT&T internal report that the tariff requirements of employing PCAs were "a redundant,
artificial and economic barrier to those wishing to purchase their own equipment"); N.E. Tel. Co.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that AT&T may have
designed PCAs in an unreasonable manner).
11. See Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), Second Report and Order,
58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976) [hereinafter MTS Second Report and Order], aff'd, N.C. Utils. Comm'n
v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977); Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and
Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS),
First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975).
112. See MTS Second Report and Order, supra note I11.
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in this market, the FCC conducted what are now known as the
Computer Inquiry proceedings, which initially restricted telephone
companies from entering the information services market and ultimately
13
focused on the enforcement of "open access" obligations."

The Computer Inquiry proceedings addressed the core concern that
incumbent telephone providers would use their power in the
telecommunications market to eliminate competition in the adjacent
information services market. 114 In particular, the FCC identified the
twin risks that the incumbent telephone providers would "cross-

subsidize" their information services products by placing joint and
common costs in the regulated telecommunications affiliate and that
they would discriminate against nonaffiliated information service
providers by degrading their level of access to the telephone network.
Unfortunately, the FCC's justifications for its shifting policies on how
to protect information services from the telephone companies'
anticompetitive conduct undermined its position in court. Thus, the
FCC's last revision of these rules, its Computer III regime, has yet to be
upheld.11 5
Consequently, the Computer Inquiries-unlike the
universally praised Carterfone regime-have
received mixed
16
reviews.1
On a similar leveraging theory, both the Department of Justice and
MCI successfully challenged AT&T's conduct in the long distance
market, explaining that AT&T's predatory conduct violated the antitrust
113. For a good review of these proceedings, see Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal
Communication Commission's Computer Inquiries,55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003).
114. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, para. 15 (1966) (noting
that common carriers will compete with information service providers and that information
service providers will "be dependent upon common carriers for reasonably priced communication
facilities and services"); see also United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 566 (D.D.C.
1987) (noting ability and incentive of telecommunications providers to discriminate against
information service providers).
115. Initially, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the FCC's rules for a failure to address the crosssubsidization issue. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1233-38 (9th Cir. 1990); see also id.
at 1228-29 & n. 16 (pointing out inconsistent rationales). After remand, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the rules insofar as they addressed the cross-subsidy concern, but reversed and remanded them on
the ground that they failed to guard effectively against discrimination concerns. See California v.
FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926-27, 930 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding justification that Computer III and
concomitant regulatory reforms guard against cross-subsidy and concluding that rules to address
discriminatory access concerns are not sufficiently supported to withstand judicial scrutiny).
116. Compare Warren G. Lavey, Ending Structural Separationfor the Telephone Companies,
18 CONN. L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1985) (arguing that Computer l's separate subsidiary requirement
did not rest on any demonstrated monopoly abuses or cost-benefit analysis), with Jonathan
Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms,
Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 222
(1999) (judging regulatory strategy taken by Computer Inquiriesas "wildly successful").
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laws. 1 17 Consequently, AT&T agreed in a consent decree to divest its
incumbent local telephone operations from its long distance and
equipment manufacturing arms and subject the newly created Regional
Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") to a quarantine that restricted
them to providing regulated local service. 118 The decree also imposed a
set of "equal access" obligations to ensure that all long distance
providers would receive nondiscriminatory access to the local networks
1 19
for purposes of originating and terminating long distance calls.
Ultimately, however, the Telecom Act ended the RBOCs quarantine and
provided for competition in all telecommunications markets through
entry of local providers into long distance markets and long distance
120
providers into local service markets.
The second regulatory tool often discussed under the open access
umbrella is "unbundling." Unbundling requires that a firm-often a
monopolist-provide separately two products that it might otherwise
wish to offer together. In some cases, where the two products are
clearly distinct, this requirement is easily understood and implemented.
In the regulation of telecommunications equipment, for example, the
FCC initially imposed an unbundling mandate, requiring that
telecommunications providers "unbundle" the sale of telephone service
from equipment. 12 1 In other cases, particularly in high technology
markets, unbundling mandates require that regulators closely supervise
product design decisions. 122 Finally, unbundling can be particularly
controversial where it involves a mandated leasing arrangement and
regulators decide upon the wholesale price at which the unbundled
product is offered to a competitor. Indeed, with respect to the Telecom

117. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
118. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 161.
119. See id. at 227.
120. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (providing for Bell company entry into
in-region long distance markets).
121. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer H]. After the development of
a competitive market for equipment, the FCC ultimately lifted this unbundling requirement,
relying solely on the certification requirement to protect competition. See Review of Customer
Premises Equipment and Enhanced Services Unbundling Rules in the lnterexchange, Exchange
Access and Local Exchange Markets, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, para. 1 (2001); see also Computer II,
supra, para. 9 (lifting tariff requirements on CPE in light of certification regime and competitive
opportunities in that market).
122. This is the case involving computer software products, for example. See M. Sean Royall,
Coping with the Antitrust of Technological Integration, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 1023, 1056 (2001)
(discussing how competitors' marketing decisions affect regulation).
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Act, the ongoing debates and litigation over unbundling policy largely
123
revolve around this contentious issue.
The
final regulatory
tool
involves
the regulation
of
"interconnection." The concepts of interconnection and compatibility
requirements are sometimes used interchangeably, but for present
purposes, this Article conceives of interconnection as the relationship
between two competitors using the same technology platforms-say,
wireless networks or Internet backbone networks.
Compatibility
requirements, by contrast, govern the relationship between a platform
and a complementary product-say, the telephone network and a
telephone or a modem.
Like mandated leasing requirements,
interconnection regulation can involve the oversight of some technical
arrangements (e.g., how to interconnect) as well as price regulation
(e.g., how to regulate the cost of exchanging traffic).
Because
interconnection does not involve the use of shared facilities, however, it
is often less difficult to oversee than mandated leasing requirements.
In the Internet arena, there are only the beginnings of a regulatory
regime that mandates any form of open access to Internet products or
services. As noted above, the FCC is just beginning to consider what, if
any, policies should be imposed on broadband transmission facilities,
including whether any of the Computer Inquiry rules should be imposed
on broadband platforms. By contrast, with respect to the Internet
backbone market, the FCC has not even reached this stage of oversight,
as its pronouncements to date have all suggested that no interconnection
requirement is likely to be necessary. 124 Nonetheless, with respect to
the instant messaging market, the FCC concluded that an
interconnection
requirement might be necessary to avoid
anticompetitive harms and that AOL Time Warner, as a condition of its
merger approval, would be subject to regulatory oversight on that
score. 125 Like the questionable judgments that underlie some of the
123. See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (upholding the
legality of the FCC's methodology for pricing unbundled access six years after its adoption).
124. See MICHAEL KENDE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET BACKBONES
4-9 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003); see also James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 247-501
(2002).
125. See AOL Order, supra note 33, para. 191; Weiser, Internet Governance, supra note 13, at
835-36. The FCC later concluded that its imposition of an interconnection mandate was
unnecessary and inappropriate. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc.,
Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee; Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for Relief
from the Condition Restricting Streaming Video AIHS, CS Docket No. 00-30 (Aug. 20, 2003),
availableat 2003 FCC LEXIS 4700.
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FCC's revisions of the Computer Inquiry rules, the FCC's tentative and
sometimes contradictory steps in this area reveal that it has yet to
develop a clear economic justification for its open access policies.
2. Some Economics of Open Access
I, along with Joseph Farrell, have offered an extensive explanation of
how the FCC should analyze open access issues, so I will only offer a
brief synopsis of that analysis here. 12 6 First, and in an often
underappreciated principle, even a platform monopolist has a powerful
incentive to attract compatible applications to its platform. Take, for
example, Palm's position in Personal Digital Assistants, where it still
possesses a formidable share of the operating systems ("OS") market.
Rather than try to monopolize the market for applications for its own
OS platform, Palm shares access to its operating system. This allows
others, such as Handspring, to build value-added products and also
encourages developers to create applications for its system. Why is
Palm so welcoming of outside innovation? Because the more valuable
its system-i.e., its OS platform in conjunction with the applications for
it-the more money it will earn in OS revenue. Thus, Palm possesses a
powerful incentive, which Joseph Farrell and I call the "internalization
of complementary externalities," or ICE, to attract and support
1 27
applications for its platform.
Based on the attitude of platform monopolists suggested by the ICE
theory and Palm's behavior, one might conclude that no regulatorily
imposed open access obligations are necessary or advisable. I will
come back to this argument shortly, which is associated with the
Chicago School perspective and is often referred to as the "one
monopoly profit" theory. 12 8 But before discussing the premise of this
argument, it is important to acknowledge that there are exceptions to the
ICE theory, which underlie, among other things, the antitrust cases
against AT&T and Microsoft.
The most significant exception to ICE that is almost universally
acknowledged is Baxter's Law.
This exception, named after the
architect of the AT&T consent decree, former antitrust chief and scholar
William Baxter, focuses on the propensity of a platform monopolist
facing price regulation to evade that regulation by leveraging its market
126. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 7.
127. Seeid.
128. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229 (1978) ("[Viertically related
monopolies can take only one monopoly profit."); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 870 (2d ed. 1981) ("There is only one monopoly profit to be made in
a chain of production.").
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power from the platform market into adjacent and unregulated
applications markets. 129 In the ideal scenario for the monopolist, it can
evade the strictures of regulation in the platform market by charging a
monopoly price in the applications market. For AT&T, its opposition to
the Carterfone decision and the subsequent open access rules related to
equipment markets stemmed in considerable part from the fact that
those rules limited AT&T's ability to use this tactic successfully. 130 In
the pre-Carterfone days, the AT&T monopoly could offer consumers
only one choice for a phone and charge high prices for that product,
often in the form of a leasing arrangement. But when consumers were
able to take advantage of competitive alternatives-instead of paying
the incumbent's rate for a leased phone-AT&T lost a source of
monopoly profits.
Baxter's Law also recognizes more subtle versions of monopolistic
conduct. For starters, given that regulators are inherently imperfect, a
platform monopolist can fairly easily find ways of moving the costs of
developing a complementary product into the platform market and thus
make profits in the unregulated market. 13 1 Again, in the equipment
market, AT&T could gain an unfair advantage over competitors by
shifting a substantial share of the development costs to the regulated
telephone service side of the operation. For most businesses, such
tactics would come back to hurt them, but under rate of return
regulation, firms can survive-and even thrive-using such tactics
because they are promised a rate of return for all expenditures made as
part of delivering the regulated service. 132 In addition to using crosssubsidization, a platform monopolist can also-as was alleged of AT&T
for both equipment manufacturing and long distance markets129. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity,and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50
(1999) (discussing "Baxter's Law" and deeming it the "Bell Doctrine").
130. The state regulatory authorities opposed the Carterfone regime for a different reason: the
removal of the customer premises equipment from the local network (with which it previously
had been bundled) limited the scope of the charges that state authorities could regulate and use to
subsidize other services.
131. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 170-71 (D.D.C. 1982)
(discussing AT&T's use of this practice), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
132. The institution of price-cap regulation, which aims to sever the link between
expenditures and allowable earnings, ameliorates this problem, but does not necessarily solve it
entirely. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that price-cap
regulation "significantly reduce[s]" an incumbent firm's "incentive and ability" to engage in
cross-subsidization); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(explaining how price-cap regulation "reduces" an incumbent telephone provider's ability to
"shift costs from unregulated to regulated activities, because the increase in costs for the regulated
activity does not automatically cause an increase in the legal rate ceiling").
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discriminate against nonaffiliated firms by making it more difficult for
them to offer reliable products or services that are compatible with the
platform. In the face of these competitive concerns, Baxter concluded
that the only effective remedy against AT&T was a quarantine of the
reduce
regulated local monopolists on the theory that this remedy would
133
both the incentive and opportunity to engage in such tactics.
In addition to Baxter's Law, there are a number of exceptions to ICE,
many of which fall into what commentators call the "post-Chicago
School" of antitrust economics. 134 Rather than discuss those issues
here, this Article focuses on two particular exceptions that could arise in
the Internet context and that animated the Department of Justice's
antitrust case against Microsoft. First, there is the competitive concern
raised in the Microsoft case that, for certain markets, complementary
products can threaten the platform monopoly itself. In United States v.
Microsoft,135 the Justice Department argued that Microsoft viewed
Netscape's web browser product, particularly in combination with Java
technologies, as a threat to its platform monopoly in the operating
systems market and thus adopted a set of predatory strategies to exclude
Netscape from the market. 136 Second, there are instances in which a
platform provider may use its gatekeeping role to "hold up" the
deployment of applications, thereby giving itself an additional source of
revenue and deterring future innovation. In the Microsoft case, the
threat to Netscape to cooperate with Microsoft or face destruction
reflects a possible instance of this exception to ICE. 137 Similarly, this
concern also surfaced in the antitrust case against AT&T, as it used this
tactic in declining to allow innovators to provide new technologies for

133. See Joskow & Noll, supra note 129, at 1249-50 (discussing Baxter's thinking on this
point).
134. For an early survey of this movement, see Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in
Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 651-52 (1989).

135. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), affid in part, rev'd in
part,253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
136. See id. at 38 ("In this case, Microsoft early on recognized middleware as the Trojan horse
that, once having, in effect, infiltrated the applications barrier, could enable rival operating
systems to enter the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems unimpeded. Simply put,
middleware threatened to demolish Microsoft's coveted monopoly power."); see also James B.
Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities,and Network Externalities:A Comment on Piraino,93 NW. U.

L. REv. 1277, 1282 (1999) (pointing out that Microsoft's predatory actions vis-A-vis Netscape
can be explained on the ground that Microsoft viewed the browser as a partial substitute for the
operating system); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We
Know, and Don't Know, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 73 (2001) (same).

137. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46 (discussing Microsoft's proposal).
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use in the telecommunications industry and suggesting that it would
138
introduce those technologies through its own affiliate.

Commentators continue to argue over whether ICE represents the
central rule or is, in fact, the exception. 139

Pointing to the FCC's

tradition of open access regulation and the use of a similar commitment
to "modularity" in developing the Internet, some commentators, most
notably Professor Lawrence Lessig, argue that regulation should insist
on an open architecture model in Internet markets. 140 In contrast to this
plea for openness, many Chicago School adherents maintain that the
marketplace can be trusted-Baxter's Law excepted, of course-to
enforce a commitment to open architecture where it would be efficient
to employ such a strategy. 14 1 Finally, there is room for a third way that
follows the model of antitrust in presuming that minimal intervention is

appropriate, but is sensitive to the possibility of exceptions to ICE and
believing that regulators can diagnose and address such exceptions
effectively.
B. An Antitrust-like Model for BroadbandRegulation

The FCC's current broadband proceedings have produced a familiar
debate about the merits of open access regulation and its challenges.
The one notable exception to the usual open architecture versus Chicago
14 2
School debate is the network neutrality argument outlined above.
Network neutrality proponents concede that open access rules designed

to facilitate the preservation of alternative ISPs may be unwise because
they do not necessarily protect the development of Internet content and
services and they would entail the difficult work associated with the

type

of

unbundling

regime

required

by the

Telecom

Act. 143

Unfortunately, they also have yet to develop a clearly articulated

explanation of the economics behind or the legal framework to
138. See, e.g., Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 202 (1997) (relating AT&T's
explanation to Coming, Inc., that "it would be 30 years before [AT&T's] telephone system would
be ready for optical fiber" and that when it was, [AT&T] would make its own).
139. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 278-79 ("The principal difference between Chicago and postChicago economic analysis" is the prevalence of a "complex set of assumptions about how a
market works, [which make] anticompetitive outcomes seem more plausible.").
140. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS 147-67 (2001).
141. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)
("[Jiudicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous
condemnations are not.").
142. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (describing the network neutrality
argument).
143. See Wu, supra note 30.
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administer this form of regulation. In my view, an appealing version of
the network neutrality approach is to implement the principle through
an antitrust-like approach to regulation.
For some, an "antitrust-like approach to regulation" would appear to
be an oxymoron, as a number of commentators suggest that antitrust
144
law should replace telecommunications regulation altogether.
Alternatively, some commentators argue that antitrust law can discipline
regulation and give meaning to the FCC's broad mandate embodied in
its public interest standard. 145 Taking an antitrust-like approach to
regulation, however, means that regulatory agencies can look to the
antitrust model for guidance even without purporting to follow its
standards as a court would. In particular, I envision an antitrust-like
approach to regulation as (1) relying on a basic standard developed by
after-the-fact judgments, (2) being sensitive to the ICE principle and
tethering regulatory intervention to its exceptions, and (3) reflecting a
careful awareness that regulatory intervention must be likely to do more
good than harm. This Section will outline each principle in turn and
then explain how, taken together, they provide a model of regulation for
broadband markets.
1. A Nondiscrimination Standard Developed by After-the-fact
Judgments
Unlike proactive command and control regulation, antitrust law relies
on basic standards developed through adjudication. A central virtue of
this approach is that the Sherman Act's statutory policies are generally
enforced through legal standards and not categorical rules. The legal
standard that forms the heart of the Sherman Act is the rule of reason,
which requires a balancing of competitive harms and benefits before
condemning a practice as illegal. 146 Moreover, the antitrust regime,
with the exceptions of practices proven to have a "pernicious effect on
competition and [no] redeeming virtue," does not categorically
condemn practices as per se illegal. 147
Nonetheless, where
practices are facially anticompetitive, the antitrust laws allow for an
abbreviated rule of reason inquiry that presumes such conduct to be

144. See HUBER, supra note 49, at 3-9.
145. See John W. Berresford, The Future of the FCC: Promote Competition, Then Relax, 50
ADMIN. L. REv. 731, 733 & n.7 (1998).
146. See Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48
(1994) (discussing the rule of reason inquiry and its virtues).
147. N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (stating that although some activities
may be per se illegal, the principle of per se unreasonableness avoids intensive complicated
investigations in practices and agreements).
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illegal, but offers firms an opportunity to present a benign explanation
14 8
for such conduct.
Following the antitrust model, telecommunications regulation could
develop a similar regulatory architecture for Internet markets that are
not prone to Baxter's Law, but where there are reasons to be concerned
about anticompetitive conduct.
This model would announce a
regulatory standard of nondiscriminatory access, but refuse to elaborate
on that standard until parties demonstrated an actual denial of such
access.
Thus, rather than rely on the prophylactic (or ex ante)
development of categorical rules to regulate behavior, the FCC could
announce a standard that would be enforced after-the-fact.
The FCC's development of an antitrust-like regime would attempt to
give the marketplace more freedom to evolve and would rely on
subsequent proceedings to determine whether incumbent broadband
providers acted in an anticompetitive manner. A likely version of this
type of regulation would rely on the presumption that a discriminatory
access arrangement-be it to Internet content, services, or equipmentis anticompetitive, but would offer the broadband tranmission provider
the opportunity to justify the practice with reference to a legitimate
business reason. In prior instances of enforcing a nondiscrimination
mandate, the FCC has adopted this type of a burden shifting approach,
as it provides the firm with the best access to the information an
49
opportunity to justify conduct that is facially suspect. 1
In evaluating the merits of an antitrust-like model versus the adoption
of proactive command and control rules, regulators must take seriously
the difficulty of gathering reliable information and superintending
alternative possible remedies. In particular, many affected parties will
view regulatory intervention as an opportunity to gain an advantage
over a competitor and thus will provide misleading information to
regulators. 150 By not only identifying the types of competitive risks that
may occur, but also insisting on clear and actual evidence of such risks,
regulators can ensure that they respond appropriately to actual
1 51
competitive threats-and not speculative ones.

148. See Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 716-22 (1998); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770
(1999).
149. See Nat'l Communications Ass'n v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2001)
(explaining FCC's practice and rationale for burden-shifting approach).
150. See Weiser, Internet Governance, supra note 13, at 841.
151. This Article does not discuss the exact details of how such an enforcement regime would
work, including whether and how it would provide opportunities for alternative dispute resolution
short of a litigated decision.
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2. ICE and Its Exceptions
The hardest question for regulators in confronting demands to impose
open access regulation is how to calibrate the appropriate default rule.
As noted above, some commentators suggest that regulators should not
be willing to allow any deviation from a completely open architecture,
fearing that the exceptions to ICE may well constitute the rule in terms
of how platform monopolists are likely to behave. 152 Others explain
that regulatory involvement in such decisions is wholly unnecessary, as
in a world without price regulation, monopolists who do not follow ICE
53
will be disciplined either by the market or by antitrust law. 1
Unlike courts hearing antitrust cases, which must wait until after an
actual antitrust violation has been proved before acting, the FCC is
empowered to supervise access obligations when it concludes that the
marketplace is vulnerable to anticompetitive conduct. 154 Indeed, the
very premise of economic regulation is that agencies can make
predictive judgments about likely economic effects and balance the
costs and benefits from their regulation. 155 On a similar rationale,
Congress provided for a regulatory presumption against mergers
between cable and local telephone companies because potential
competition arguments would be difficult to evaluate from a pure
56
antitrust standpoint. 1

152. See LESSIG, supra note 140, at 147-67.
153. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 2 (stating that monopoly prices are selfdestructive and attract entry).
154. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-24 (1943).
155. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (stating that
complete factual support is not required where agency predictions "necessarily involve[]
deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency"); Am. Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 891 F.2d 304, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that agencies are entitled to make
"predictive judgments" and that "'complete factual support"' is not required when they act within
their area of expertise (citation omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 517 (1991); N.C.
Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1054 (4th Cir. 1977) ("[N]o general principle of
administrative law forces all agencies to conduct exhaustive economic impact studies before
taking action.").
156. See 47 U.S.C. § 572(d)(6)(A)(iii) (2000) (barring mergers between local telephone and
cable companies unless the FCC determines that "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served"). Similarly, one could
imagine similar cases where the regulatory authorities would judge certain mergers too risky from
a competitive standpoint, even where there remained some uncertainty as to whether they would
meet an antitrust standard.
See Joel Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to
Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During the Process of Electric Power Restructuring
(Jan. 21, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l1332.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003).
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Chicago School critics doubt whether regulators can engage in a
careful balancing of the costs and benefits of regulation, but the success
of the Carterfone decision suggests that there is, at the very least,
considerable potential merit in economic regulation when there are
reasons to believe that market failures exist.1 57 Moreover, where the
FCC fails to justify its regulatory strategies, the courts play a salutary
role in evaluating its decisions. 15 8 In order to justify the regulatory
measures it develops, the FCC should analyze, by reference to ICE and
its exceptions, whether it is reasonably likely that a platform monopolist
will act in an anticompetitive fashion towards application markets.
Similarly, if the FCC imposes a nondiscrimination standard along the
lines outlined in this Article, it should insist that any party alleging a
violation of that standard also provide a reasonably plausible theory as
to why a firm would discriminate in a manner not suggested by ICEi.e., explain how one of the ICE's exceptions can shed light on the
purportedly anticompetitive conduct.
3. Is It Worth the Candle?: The Costs of Regulation
Even where the FCC identifies competitive harms that are reasonably
likely to occur, it is still possible that the regulatory cures to those
harms will be worse than the disease. To borrow from antitrust
jurisprudence, regulators should take account of the potential for
erroneous regulatory intervention, the negative side effects of possible
remedies, and the presence of alternative regulatory strategies. 159 This
Subsection will first discuss some of the potential costs of regulation
and then apply those to the broadband context.
A paramount concern for regulators must be whether the regulatory
initiative itself will create such formidable administrative costs as to
overwhelm any benefits arising from it. The Carterfone regime avoided
this fate by focusing on measures that required minimal regulatory
effort-the compatibility regime enforced through a certification
requirement and an easy-to-understand unbundling requirement. The
merits of some of the Computer Inquiry rules, at least with respect to
157. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1113-14 (7th
Cir. 1985) (upholding regulation of airlines to address, among other things, practices with respect
to the operation of computerized reservation systems).
158. See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049, 1056 (7th Cir.

1992) (rejecting regulation of television network's entry into production as unjustified).
159. For a similar model, see Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture
in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (2001). Shelanski & Sidak identify three
related considerations for the development of antitrust remedies: (1) the cost of "false positives,"
(2) the competitive costs of not taking action, and (3) the costs of administering a remedial

regime. Id.
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certain products such as voicemail, are not so easily defended. 160 In the
context of implementing the Telecom Act's market opening provisions,

the presence of significant administrative costs continues to be a
challenge.

As Justice Breyer put it, "[e]ven the simplest kind of

compelled sharing, say, requiring a railroad to share bridges, tunnels, or
track, means that someone must oversee the terms and conditions of that
sharing."' 16 1 In the context of Internet-related products, such challenges
may multiply if unbundling mandates require a regulator to direct the
redesign of a technologically integrated product for use by
62
competitors. 1
In addition to the concern that mandated access for multiple ISPs
does not address the core concern of protecting the development of
Internet-facilitated content and services, 163 the regulatory effort to
facilitate unbundled access to broadband transmission is a considerable
deterrent to adopting any such policy. Unlike contractual tying
arrangements, where the tied product is sold separately at a market
price, there is no market price for the broadband transmission that ISPs
are interested in purchasing. Thus, as demonstrated by the fact that the
open access provisions in the consent decree imposed by the Federal

Trade Commission ("FTC") on AOL Time Warner rely on the contract
negotiated with Earthlink, 164 any assurance of open access for ISPs will

160. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1,
at 3-4 (discussing costs-measured in the billions of dollars-imposed by the FCC's structural
separation requirement and other regulation that delayed the introduction of voicemail).
161. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Spulber & Yoo, supra note 1, at 895-99 (outlining concerns
related to compelled access arrangements).
162. See Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal To
Deal-Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 675 n.30 (2001)
(suggesting a limiting principle that only where a benchmark exists for a discriminatory access
arrangement between a vendor and different customers, which is designed to and has the effect of
undermining competition in a related market, should antitrust scrutiny attach).
163. See Gerald Falhauber, Comments at the E-2-E Workshop (Dec. 1, 2000) (calling multiple
ISP access "simply an ISP preservation act"), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
e2e/papers/Fal.pdf2 (last visited Sept. 14, 2003). "[O]pen access for ISPs on cable broadband is
not the same as full content access and guaranteed developer access. It may or may not be a good
proxy, but nobody has made a serious argument that it is." Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL AND REGULATORY FACTORS AFFECTING CONSUMER CHOICE OF
INTERNET PROVIDERS (Oct. 2000) (noting body of expert opinion suggesting that a reduction in
ISPs did not, in and of itself, pose a threat to users of the Internet through broadband
connections), available at http://www.gao.gov/news.items/d01345.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2003).
164. See In re Am. Online, Inc., F.T.C. CS No. C-3989 Sec. H.A (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/200l/04/aoltwdo.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
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require regulators to set a price for wholesale access. 165 In addition to
price setting, unbundling of broadband transmission would also raise a
series of questions for regulators relating to the quality of the access and
coordination issues regarding shared bandwidth, which would
invariably result in market delays and uncertainty. 166 Finally, in
answering such questions, the Commission might well, in effect,
institute a set of access arrangements that would preclude marketplace
16 7
experimentation with alternative forms of access.
The network neutrality proposal, particularly if implemented through
an antitrust-like approach, should involve minimal regulatory costs. To

the extent that a nondiscrimination norm tracks what most efficient
platform monopolists would do anyway, it may not generate many cases
of noncompliance. But to the extent that there are cases where Internet
content, services, or equipment are not allowed to connect to a
broadband network in a nondiscriminatory manner, it is reasonable for
the FCC to require an explanation. Particularly because there would be

an opportunity for firms to justify such restrictions, which is not usually
the case with traditional command and control regulation, this model of

regulation would only minimally restrict the marketplace by focusing on
16 8
core competitive concerns.

4. Carterfone Revisited
The FCC's actions in its broadband rulemakings may prove to be the
Carterfone decision for the Internet age.
As I envision it, the
importance of developing an appropriate network neutrality requirement
165. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare:
Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Unbundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 924-25 (2001). Other
"open access" advocates acknowledge that such a step would require the provision of wholesale
access at regulatorily established terms and conditions as well as regulation of the uses for the
product. See Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open Access Debate: The Casefor a Wholesale
Market, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 672 (2000).
166. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The greater the administrative burden, for example, the more the need for complex proceedings,
the very existence of which means delay .... "); Warren G. Lavey, Ending Structural Separation
for Telephone Companies, 18 CONN. L. REV. 81, 86 (1985) (noting how, under the Computer I
regime, parties were forced to undergo the time, expense, and uncertainty of long regulatory
proceedings of litigating the status of "hybrid services").
167. See DEBORAH A. LATHEN, CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, BROADBAND TODAY: A STAFF
REPORT TO WILLIAM E. KENNARD, CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, ON INDUSTRY MONITORING SESSIONS CONVENED BY CABLE SERVICES BUREAU
40 (1999) (noting the different conceptions of what type of access arrangement is optimal),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf (last visited Sept.
14, 2003).
168. See Phil Weiser, ParadigmChanges in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 819, 835-36 (2000).
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is that it would help ensure that the Internet's basic protocol remains
open and nonproprietary. At present, the basic architecture of the
Internet rests on wide-open access to content and services that are
compatible with the TCP/IP protocol. 169 As long as this remains true,
customers will also be able to access content or services over the
Internet regardless of their ISP. 170 To be sure, this regime would not
necessarily protect every aspect of the Internet's "end-to-end" design, as
network providers might be able to justify certain exceptions from the
"end-to-end" principle related to, say, filtering spam.171
To safeguard the Internet's open nature, the FCC would need to be
sensitive to any effort by a broadband provider to limit access to
172
Internet content, such as blocking access to specific websites.
Indeed, this form of "open access" is prevalent in today's Internet, 17 3 so
imposing this requirement would be a fairly costless policy to ensure
that widespread access remains available. Among other things, it would
assure content and applications developers that consumers would not be
denied access to their innovations unless the
developers surrendered
174
them to the broadband transmission provider.

169. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § RI5 11.8.1, at

1053 (2d ed. 1999) ("TCP/IP is the universal protocol of unbundled, equal access carriage-a
protocol that is content-neutral, network-neutral, medium-neutral. It is, in short, the purest form
of 'common carriage."').
170. As the FCC explained:
It bears repeating that cable modem service subscribers, by "click-through" access,
may obtain many functions from companies with whom the cable operator has not
even a contractual relationship. For example, a subscriber to Comcast's cable modem
service may bypass that company's web browser, proprietary content, and email. The
subscriber is free to download and use instead, for example, a web browser from
Netscape, content from Fox News, and email in the form of Microsoft's "Hotmail."
Whether the subscriber chooses to utilize functions offered by his cable modem service
provider or obtain them from another source, these functions are all included in the
standard cable modem service offering.
Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 25 (citation omitted).
171. For an excellent discussion of the Internet's "end-to-end" design principle and the
reasons for allowing exceptions to it, see Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking
the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, ACM
TRANSACTIONS
ON
INTERNET
TECH.
1,
70
(2001),
available at
http://

www.nationalacademies.org/cstb/people-blumenthal.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
172. See id. at 91-92 (discussing the relationship between domain name system and the
Internet access provider).
173. Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. II (stating that cable allows operators and
subscribers to access anything available on the internet).
174. The Commission's Cable Modem Order noted this possibility:
We note that we are unaware of any allegation that a cable operator has denied "click
through" access to other ISPs. Moreover, although it is technically feasible for a cable
operator to deny access to unaffiliated content, or to relegate unaffiliated content to the
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Under a reactive model of regulation to enforce a nondiscrimination
norm, the Commission would not need to impose mandatory disclosure
rules governing the design of broadband networks of the type contained
in the Computer III rules, 17 5 but could enforce and develop a basic
17 6
nondiscrimination standard through case-by-case adjudications.
Indeed, it seems particularly unwise to develop a set of disclosure
requirements-let alone mandate that an underlying transmission
component be provided separately under tariff-if broadband providers

are likely in any event to set up a "private commons" to ensure that
equipment manufacturers and Internet content and services developers
have access to the necessary specifications and bandwidth. As the FCC
has recognized, proactive regulation such as mandated tariffing has a
series of drawbacks, including delaying the introduction of new
services, facilitating tacit collusion, and imposing administrative costs
177
on service providers.
Should individual companies manipulate the relevant interfaces,
deceive users or developers about the openness of the relevant
specifications, or take any other actions that commentators have
speculated as likely to unnecessarily limit innovation, 178 the FCC would
need to condemn such conduct quickly. 17 9 In particular, if the FCC
"slow lane" of its residential high-speed Internet access service, we are unaware of a
single allegation that a cable operator has done so.
Cable Modem Order, supra note 3, para. 87.
175. See Cannon, supra note 113, at 201 (detailing Computer III requirements).
176. By waiving some of Computer llfs affirmative requirements, the FCC has already begun
to move in this direction. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating
Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of
Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, para.
4 (1999) (posting of comparably efficient interconnection plans on a website deemed sufficient to
satisfy Computer Inquiry rules).
177. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Second Report
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, para. 177 (1994) [hereinafter Communications Act Order]; see also
Motion of AT&T Corp. To Be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, II F.C.C.R. 3271,
para. 27 (1995).
178. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE
J. ON REG. 129, 158 (2001) (discussing concerns related to "content discrimination" that could
involve strategies ranging from "blocking outside content entirely, to affording affiliated content
preferential caching treatment").
179. By using a complaint procedure with a pre-determined regulatory framework-i.e., a
presumption that discriminatory access arrangements are troubling and an opportunity to
demonstrate a legitimate business justification-the FCC can facilitate an efficient and effective
disposition of complaints. See, e.g., Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(a)(2) of the
Communications Act of 1934, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417, para. 150 (1999) (stating that
failure to make services accessible to handicapped persons can be justified, on a case-by-case
basis, by showing that it was not "readily achievable").
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identified conduct along these lines that violated the nondiscrimination
standard, it should then proceed to consider developing any necessary
proactive rules to prevent such or similar conduct from recurring.
Significantly, the nondiscrimination approach-even if supplemented
with rules resulting from experience-would not prevent universally
applied rules that restrict broadband transmission for all uses or
applications, nor would it call for the regulation of the price of

access.180
The regulatory architecture for the model of regulation outlined here
would bear some important similarities to the Carterfone regime and
some notable differences from the Computer Inquiry rules. Like
Carterfone, it would rely on a presumption-and one grounded in
economic theory-about the manner in which a platform monopolist
relates to those in adjacent markets. 18 1 Similarly, it would follow the
Computer Inquiries' creativity in classifying CPE and information
services under Title I and devising an alternative regulatory regime to
that prescribed by Title 11,182 making clear that it would address any
plausible competitive harms should they arise. 183 Unlike the Computer
Inquiries, however, it would not impose an extensive array of
obligations on platform providers based on expected harms to
competition.
The FCC has yet to develop a regime along the lines of the model
urged here, but its Carterfone precedent provides some important
guideposts. Significantly, Carterfone itself recognized the principle,
underscored in antitrust law, that a firm need not interconnect its
network to rivals where it would prove detrimental to the network to do
so. 184 Indeed, in the wake of Carterfone, providers of enhanced
services or equipment who could not establish that the arrangements in
question were actually discriminatory were not provided the

180. At present, the cable companies limit the usage of cable modems (including restricting
the use of home computers as servers) because of technical concerns about the capacity of their
network, which even some open access advocates recognize as a potentially legitimate business
practice related to the limits of the cable network. See Hausman et al., supra note 178, at 149.
By contrast, selected restrictions that target particular activities that compete with the cable
company, such as video streaming, may raise competitive concerns. See id. at 160-61.
181. The D.C. Circuit has previously endorsed the reliance on reasonable presumptions in
regulatory policy. See W. Res., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 109 F.3d 782, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
182. See Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC., 693 F.2d 198, 212 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (upholding FCC's conclusion "that an alternative regulatory scheme would more
effectively further the goals of the Act").
183. See Computer II, supra note 121, paras. 124-27.
184. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, supra note 107, at
421.
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compatibility arrangement they sought. 18 5 Similarly, with respect to the
requirement that wireline providers interconnect with wireless providers
at reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates, the FCC adopted a reactive
model of regulation that relied on complaint proceedings based on a
presumption approach. 186 To be sure, there were not many complaint
proceedings of this kind conducted by the FCC, but the fact that there
were some is encouraging, suggesting that the FCC could examine on a
case-by-case basis whether certain policies enforced by broadband
providers were discriminatory or justified by legitimate business
87
reasons. 1
VI. CONCLUSION

The FCC is now facing a set of issues that will help shape the future
evolution of the Internet and the role of government in its development.
During the first generation of the Internet, the government provided
funding and support that kept the Internet's basic standard (TCP/IP)
open and nonproprietary and the FCC enforced its Computer Inquiry
rules to ensure that competition developed in the information service
market. When the government privatized its infrastructure and adopted
a philosophy of "unregulation" during the second generation of the
Internet, the FCC hesitated to develop or enforce regulations in this
context. But as FCC Chairman Powell recognizes, "[t]he important
public policy question is not whether to regulate the Internet or not...
it is how to regulate it responsibly in a manner that maximizes
consumer welfare and does not stunt its infinite growth and innovation
88
potential." 1
185. Rogers Radio Communications Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 751 F.2d 408, 414-15 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (upholding FCC's decision that Rogers was not entitled to an access arrangement more
favorable than that provided to the incumbent provider's own affiliate).
186. See Communications Act Order, supra note 177, paras. 233-34 (explaining that a
showing of discrimination in interconnection arrangements constitutes a prima facie case that can
be rebutted by a demonstration that the requested arrangement is either "not technically feasible
or is not economically reasonable").
187. Under such a system, for example, the FCC would be authorized to determine whether
limitations on video streaming might be a legitimate means of protecting bandwidth unrelated to
any motivation to protect the revenue streams from video programming interests. See James B.
Speta, The Vertical Dimensions of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 975 (2000)

(explaining why limits might be legitimate). Similarly, providers could justify technical
discrimination on the grounds that it facilitates efficient price discrimination (i.e., of the kind that
increases output), but any such evaluations must necessarily be grounded in the facts of the
individual cases.
188. Michael Powell, Law in the Internet Age, Remarks at the D.C. Bar Association
Computer and Telecommunications Law Section and the Federal Communications Bar
Association (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2000/
spmkp002.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).
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In the wake of a series of marketplace and legal developments, the
FCC has signaled its intention to re-think how to regulate broadband
platforms in particular and the Internet more generally. 189 With respect
to this dynamic market environment, 190 the FCC faces the challenging
task of tailoring its regulatory oversight to the relevant competitive risks

and justifying its actions based on its Title I authority. The collision
between telecommunications regulation and the Internet holds out great
potential for the development of a next generation regulatory regime,
but this enterprise holds great risks for all involved and will require
even greater imagination than the FCC used in developing-based on
its Title I authority-a regulatory regime to govern CPE. By adopting
an antitrust-like model for ensuring network neutrality, the FCC could
as well as advance the principles
take an important step in that direction
19 1
set out by its broadband proceedings.

189. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, at 3070 (separate statement of Kathleen

Q. Abernathy) ("I am confident that, if market failures are identified, the Commission can and
will intervene to the extent necessary to protect consumers."); Cable Modem Order, supra note 3,
at 4867 (separate statement of Michael K. Powell) (stating that Title I "has been invoked
consistently by the Commission to guard against public interest harms and anti-competitive
results" and is adequate "to strike the right regulatory balance").
190. See Weiser, Internet Governance, supra note 13, at 830 (underscoring the need for a
regulatory strategy that recognizes the dynamism of the Internet); COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN
THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE INTERNET'S COMING
OF AGE 1 (2001) ("All indications are that the Internet revolution-given its impact, 'revolution'
appears to be the appropriate label-is not nearly over."), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309069920/html (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
191. In particular, the FCC identified four specific principles: (1) increasing the availability of
broadband; (2) developing a conception of broadband that would include "any and all platforms
capable of fusing communications power, computing power, high-bandwidth intensive content,
and access to the Internet"; (3) devising a minimal regulatory environment to promote investment
and innovation; and (4) crafting a consistent analytical framework to apply to all broadband
platforms. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 3, paras. 3-6.

